Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Common Moral Foundations When Making Moral Judgments About Influential People

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Do liberals and conservatives have qualitatively different moral points of view? Specifically, do liberals and conservatives rely on the same or different sets of moral foundations—care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity (Haidt, 2012)—when making moral judgments about influential people? In Study 1, 100 experts evaluated the impact that 40 influential figures had on each moral foundation, yielding stimulus materials for the remaining studies. In Study 2, 177 American liberal and conservative professors rated the moral character of the same figures. Liberals and conservatives relied on the same 3 moral foundations: For both groups, promoting care, fairness, and purity—but not authority or loyalty—predicted moral judgments of the targets. For liberals, promoting authority negatively predicted moral judgments. Political ideology moderated the purity–moral and especially authority–moral relationships, implying that purity and authority are grounds for political disagreement. Study 3 replicated these results with 222 folk raters. Folk liberals and conservatives disagreed even less about the moral standing of the targets than did experts. Together, these findings imply that moral foundation theory may have exaggerated differences between liberals and conservatives. The moral codes of liberals and conservatives do differ systematically; however, their similarities outweigh their differences. Liberals and conservatives alike rely on care, fairness, and purity when making moral judgments about influential people.

Keywords: morality, moral foundations, moral personality, moral exemplars, political ideology

To Republicans, Ronald Reagan was a hero (Newport, 2011). In the wake of civil unrest, Reagan reenergized American patriotism, strengthening the country's military capacity, and brought the Soviet enemy to the brink of collapse. Democrats tend to feel differently about Reagan. To political liberals, Reagan's trickle-down economic policies unfairly advantaged the rich over the poor. They see his slashing of mental health and education budgets and failure to slow the budding HIV/AIDS pandemic as cold-hearted. And they see Reagan's exercise of authority to be excessive. Reagan fired over 11,000 striking workers on one occasion and sanctioned violence against student unrest. In response to student protests at Berkeley, Reagan famously asserted, "If it takes a bloodbath, let's get it over with. No more appeasement" (Cannon, 2003, p. 295). Liberals and conservatives can agree about what Reagan *did* but draw different moral conclusions about these same actions. Reagan seems to be one ideology's hero and another ideology's villain.

Such disagreements about what it means to be a good person are characteristic of the so-called cultural war between liberals and conservatives in the United States. With frequent and impassioned ideological clashes, one might wonder if the moral perspectives of these two camps are incommensurate and irreconcilable. Observing the discrepant evaluations of Reagan raises the intuition that morality itself might vary with ideology.

Then again, is one ideology's hero always, or even often, another's villain? Or do examples like Reagan amount to polarizing figures, rare outliers who divide the camps and redouble within-group allegiance? Consider another iconic figure and contemporary of Reagan—Mother Teresa. Minor quibbles notwithstanding, might liberals and conservatives see her in a similarly positive light? If so, this agreement conjures the intuition that morality itself might have culturally universal features. Are divisive figures (like Reagan) or consensus individuals (like Mother Teresa) more the norm among influential individuals? We contend that major agreement between different ideologies about what it means to be good overshadows the minor differences.

Framing Questions

This research tested whether adherents to different ideologies—namely, political liberals and conservatives in the United States—

agree or disagree about the moral character of highly influential people. We also explored the basis of agreement and disagreement. Framing this research are two sets of related, but importantly different, questions:

1. How do people of different ideologies make judgments of character? What virtues does a liberal judge's good person embody? What virtues does a conservative judge's good person embody? Are the sets of virtues largely the same or different? These questions map out the moral domain of each ideology.

2. When people disagree about the character of others, why do they disagree? Which virtues do liberals and conservatives weight differently? For example, what lies beneath the surface of the disagreement about Reagan? These questions map out the nature of moral controversy between the two parties.

The historic perspective within moral psychology holds that the moral understanding of liberals and conservatives alike are rooted in concerns about (a) care and avoiding harm and (b) justice, fairness, equality, and reciprocity. Recently, moral foundation theory (MFT; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2007, 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007) has challenged the historic perspective, arguing that morality concerns more than just care and fairness. Next, we review each perspective and describe different predictions that each offers vis-à-vis the framing questions.

Historic Perspective

The historic perspective within moral psychology (Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1932/1977; Turiel, 1983) explored how moral reasoning, emotions, and behavior develop in children as a consequence of peer interaction and socialization. Morality was (originally) assumed to universally comprise concerns for fairness and justice: "Virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same form regardless of climate or culture. . . . The name of this ideal form is justice" (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 30). Researchers within the historic perspective explored how developing persons came to reason in a more just/fair way, under the assumption that morality and justice were one and the same to persons of all cultures.

Kohlberg (1981) argued that, as children develop, their moral reasoning advances through a universal five-stage sequence. At the intermediate Stage 3, individuals apply the rules of fairness in a circumscribed way, considering only their immediate ingroup (e.g., friends and family) as worthy of moral concern. At Stage 4, the circle of concern becomes larger. Individuals apply rules of fairness to their society, yielding a law-and-order orientation supportive of authority structures. Only at Stage 5 do individuals apply rules of fairness without prejudice, showing concern for all persons, presenting as a human rights orientation.

Within this model, politically conservative adults tend to be developmentally stagnated at Stage 4 whereas adult liberals are slightly more likely to mature to Stage 5 (Fishkin, Keniston, & McKinnon, 1973). Thus, conformity and loyalty to one's ingroup and unquestioning respect for authority figures and institutions are developmental milestones within the Kohlbergian model, ones through which all individuals develop and at which many adults

stagnate (Walker, 2004). By adulthood, conservatives may be slightly more likely to stagnate than liberals. In other words, lower stage individuals may, at times, conflate loyalty and authority with fairness whereas higher stage individuals organize them hierarchically. Social domain theory (Turiel, 1983) challenged Kohlberg's theory, essentially arguing that ingroup loyalty and respect for authority are prudential and social conventional concerns, which arise out of social domains distinct from the moral domain.

Gilligan (1982) challenged Kohlberg's morality-is-one view, pointing to the ethic of care not as a developmental stage but as a complementary concern. Many scholars were sympathetic, recognizing caring emotions such as empathy and sympathy as important moral functions (Eisenberg, 2005; Hoffman, 2000). After the dust had settled, moral psychologists largely converged on a definition of morality-as-two entailing "prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other" (Turiel, 1983, p. 3). The historic approach thus would define morality with specific content, namely, justice/fairness and care.

Within the historic approach, cultural differences in the underlying structure or foundations of morality were thought to be rare in comparison to the vast cross-cultural similarities—the universal stage sequence (Snarey, 1985) or the universal existence of the three domains of social knowledge (Turiel, 2002).

Historic Perspective Predictions

We suggest that the historic approach addresses the framing questions with the following predictions:

1. How do people of different ideologies make judgments of character? The historic approach predicts that liberals and conservatives alike rely on care and fairness.

2. When people disagree about the character of others, why do they disagree? In our reading, the historic approach claims that liberals and conservatives agree about the moral relevance of care and fairness. Conservatives, slightly more than liberals, may conflate conformity/ loyalty and law-and-order/authority concerns with the truly moral core. Any mild political disagreements would center on issues of loyalty and authority.

Moral Foundation Theory

Inspired by cultural psychology (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), MFT opens with a different kind of definition of morality, namely, those "interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible" (Haidt, 2008, p. 70). MFT defines morality by what it is *for* (viz., its function), namely, group cooperation and social harmony. The content may include any of five[1] distinct moral foundations (i.e., overarching themes). They are as follows:

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[1] Haidt (2012) called for the addition of a sixth foundation. Liberty/ oppression, which conservatives tend to rely on more than liberals, concerns equality of *opportunity*. Haidt called for a slight modification of the fairness/reciprocity foundation to focus on equality of *outcome*.

1. Care/(avoiding) harm: "basic concerns for the suffering of others, including virtues of caring and compassion" (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009, p. 111).

2. Fairness/reciprocity: "concerns about unfair treatment, inequality, and more abstract notions of justice" (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009, p. 111).

3. Loyalty/ingroup: "concerns related to obligations of group membership, such as loyalty, self-sacrifice and vigilance against betrayal" (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009, p. 111).

4. Authority/respect: "concerns related to social order and the obligations of hierarchical relationships, such as obedience, respect, and proper role fulfillment" (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009, pp. 111–112).

5. Purity/sanctity: "concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, including virtues of chastity, wholesomeness and control of desires" (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009, p. 112).

Care[2] and fairness are called the individualizing foundations because they protect individuals' freedom and well-being; loyalty, authority, and purity are called the binding foundations because they bind individuals to a collective and thereby engender group solidarity.

MFT posits that foundations are innate, hard-wired features of the evolving moral mind. Humans are born with all five; experience and cultural socialization then revise the moral mind by elaborating some foundations and pruning others (Joseph, Graham, & Haidt, 2009). Liberalism holds an optimistic view of human nature; freedoms are required to allow people to flourish. Developing within a liberal context would have the effect of tuning up the individualizing foundations, and tuning down the binding foundations. Conservatism, on the other hand, holds a pessimistic view of human nature; individual liberty is also important, but group and societal constraints are required to control selfish human nature. Conservatism thus elaborates both the individualizing and binding foundations as being of equal moral importance (Graham et al., 2009). Put simply, MFT offers a morality-is-two versus a morality-is-five account, moderated by ideology.

Evidence supporting MFT (e.g., Graham et al., 2009, 2011) showed that liberals rely on only care and fairness when making moral judgments whereas conservatives rely on all five foundations. These data exclusively concerned judgments of issues and stereotypes (e.g., gender roles); research has yet to explore the role of these foundations in judging persons. This distinction—persons versus issues—is important for two reasons. First, for MFT to be a comprehensive theory of morality, it needs to explain both kinds of judgments. Second, issues are controversial by their very nature whereas persons vary in their controversiality. For this reason, judgments of persons may be more representative of all moral judgments whereas judgments about issues may be biased toward divisive moral judgments. Assessing only judgments of issues may yield an overestimate of the role of ideology on moral judgment.

MFT Predictions

We suggest that MFT leads to the following predictions regarding the framing questions:

1. How do people of different ideologies make judgments of character? MFT predicts that liberal character judgments will be based in the two individualizing foundations (care and fairness) whereas conservative character judgments will be based in all five foundations.

2. When people disagree about the character of others, why do they disagree? MFT predicts that targets favored by conservatives would have promoted the three binding foundations (loyalty, authority, and purity) whereas targets favored by liberals would have promoted the individualizing foundations.

Moral Exemplarity or Liberal Exemplarity?

Through an MFT lens, the historic perspective's definition of morality aligns with the individualizing foundations of care and fairness, thus raising the question of whether researchers within that approach have been studying *moral* psychology or a more limited *liberal* moral psychology.

Defending the historic approach against the MFT challenge, Gray, Young, and Waytz (2012) argued that the binding foundations are moral only insofar as people perceive them to have care/fairness implications. Moreover, when their cognitive resources are depleted, conservatives relied only on the individualizing foundations (Wright & Baril, 2011). These results suggest that the individualizing foundations may comprise the hierarchically essential core of morality and that the binding foundations are a means to that end, a means that conservatives rely upon more often than liberals.

Current research within the historic approach is exploring the psychological functioning of moral exemplars—that is, influential persons who are seen as highly moral in the eyes of many. Moral exemplarity researchers have assumed the historic perspective, that moral exemplars are people who have stood for justice or cared for the disadvantaged.

Moral exemplars tend to have personalities that are remarkably different from those of everyday people (Frimer, Walker, Dunlop, Lee, & Riches, 2011; Matsuba & Walker, 2004, 2005; McAdams, Diamond, de St. Aubin, & Mansfield, 1997; Midlarsky, Jones, & Corley, 2005; Walker & Frimer, 2007). Some of these personality differences are held to be developmental in nature (Frimer & Walker, 2009; Frimer & Walker, 2012), thus begging the question of how ideologically diverse parents, educators, and societal institutions can collectively stimulate the moral development of youth and thus make virtue more common in the next generation. A critical assumption in this project is that ideologically diverse people agree about the constitution of virtue. The more suspect this assumption turns out to be, the less realistic the vision of an ideologically bridged moral education enterprise becomes.

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[2] Here and henceforth, for the sake of concision, we refer to each foundation with a single-word identifier.

Who might have embodied this ideal moral form of justice and care? Frimer, Walker, Lee, Riches, and Dunlop (2012) invited experts (Canadian academics) to rate the moral character of influential figures. Target figures were among the most influential people of the past century, as judged by and published in *Time* magazine. Mohandas Gandhi, Shirin Ebadi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Mother Teresa, Nelson Mandela, and Rosa Parks were among the top-ranking targets.[3]

Assuming that Canadian academics are generally liberal, this methodology could have identified moral exemplars or it may have identified liberal exemplars, depending on whether they are the same set or not. Frimer et al. (2012) introduced a novel informant-report procedure for identifying moral exemplars but stopped short of testing the procedure's generalizability. What remains in question is the boundary of the concept of the good person. Is each culture's notion of the good person distinct from that of other cultures? Or do their notions of the good person overlap? If so, to what degree do they overlap? The present research contributes to our understanding of this relativism versus universalism issue by introducing a novel procedure that quantitatively describes the predictive power and basis of each (universal, relative) perspective. Implementing this procedure, we tested the degree to which moral excellence is a concept shared across an ideological divide.

The Present Research and Hypotheses

The purpose of this research was to better understand how people of different ideologies made character judgments by testing the historic perspective against the MFT challenge. In three studies, participants (experts and ordinary folk) rated targets along various dimensions. In all three studies, targets were 40 figures from *Time* magazine's list of the most influential people of the 20th century ("*Time* 100: Heroes and Icons," 1999; "*Time* 100: Leaders and Revolutionaries," 1998).

Which targets were exemplars of care? Which targets were exemplars of the other four foundations? The purpose of Study 1 was to answer these questions and thus create stimulus materials for Studies 2 and 3. In Study 1, social science experts evaluated the impact of each target in terms of the five moral foundations. These expert evaluations provided an index of how much each target figure promoted or undermined each moral foundation. Analyses also tested how political ideology moderated these foundation judgments. We predicted that liberals and conservatives would generally agree when making moral foundation judgments.

In Study 2, liberal and conservative experts in the United States (college professors) rated the moral character of each target figure. We operationalized virtue as those behaviors that moral people tended to do and immoral people tended to not do. Operationally, foundations that positively predicted moral evaluations qualified as moral virtues. Analyses examined two primary questions.

First, which foundations predicted moral excellence for each ideology? The historic perspective (morality-is-two) hypothesized that predictors of moral excellence were care and fairness for both liberals and conservatives. MFT (morality-is-two-vs.-five) hypothesized the same, only adding loyalty, authority, and purity as predictors for conservatives. Second, which foundations explained disagreements between the ideologies? The historic perspective hypothesized that political ideology, at most, weakly moderated the loyalty–morality and authority–morality relationships. MFT

hypothesized that political ideology moderated the foundation–morality association equally for all five foundations. Study 3 tested whether the findings of Study 2 replicated with nonacademic raters.

Study 1: Moral Foundation Impacts of Influential Target Figures

Which persons promoted each foundation? For example, who was an exemplar of purity? In previous research on moral foundations (e.g., Graham et al., 2011), researchers classified *issues* as pertaining to one foundation or another, then checked their classification empirically by having participants rate the moral importance of each issue and factor analyzing the ratings. The task of classifying *individual persons* as embodying one foundation or another was less obviously implemented. How does one decide which individuals embody the various foundations? In this study, we gathered many expert judgments, then averaged across them while retaining any variability associated with political ideology.

Method

Targets. *Time* magazine listed the 100 most influential people of the 20th century, of both positive and negative renown. This set of figures comprises a naturalistic and representative sampling of influential people insofar as their selection was based on influence, not whether they were controversial, partisan, or praiseworthy. We selected all 40 entries within two of five categories: (a) heroes and icons and (b) leaders and revolutionaries ("*Time* 100: Heroes and Icons," 1999; "*Time* 100: Leaders and Revolutionaries," 1998). We eliminated two ambiguous entries (e.g., the American G.I.) and split two entries entailing multiple persons (e.g., the Kennedys) into individuals. This left 40 targets, which included the likes of Ronald Reagan, Marilyn Monroe, Mother Teresa, Jackie Robinson, and Adolf Hitler.

Raters (participants). Social science professors (e.g., of history, political science, global studies) in the 10 largest U.S. state universities rated the impact of the targets in terms of the five moral foundations. These individuals were suitable judges because they were likely to be knowledgeable about the target figures and to have carefully considered the meaning and consequences of the targets' actions. After gathering contact information from university websites, we sent each professor an individualized e-mail. Of 474 professors invited to participate, $N = 100$ (27% female) completed the web-based survey (21% response rate). Participation took place between May 16 and June 12, 2011. Self-identified political orientation of the expert raters varied considerably but tended, on average, toward politically liberal ($M = -1.84$, $SD = 1.43$, range $= -3$ to 3, skewness $= 1.39$), rated on a single-item 7-point scale.

Procedure. Each professor received an invitation to complete an online survey. To avoid priming effects, neither before nor during the rating of targets did experts learn of our interest in

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[3] In a second study, the authors explored motivational themes of agency and communion in existing speeches and interviews of the top- and bottom-ranking groups. For top-ranking exemplars, agency was a means to an end of communion; for bottom-ranking comparisons, agency was a means to an end of more agency.

political ideology. The survey asked experts to rate the degree to which each of 40 targets' action had an impact in terms of each of the five foundations (see Appendix A). Each target appeared on its own web-page[4] with a neutral byline taken from Wikipedia.org, a portrait image taken from Wikipedia.org or Google images, and a rating interface of moral foundations. We included a byline and image to reduce the likelihood of mistaken identities. Participants were instructed to skip those targets with whom they were unfamiliar. Finally, experts indicated their own political orientation.

Foundation impacts. For each foundation (provided verbatim as quoted in the Introduction from Haidt et al., 2009, pp. 111–112), participants rated the impact of each target on a 5-point scale, anchored as follows: -2 (*undermined*), 0 (*neutral*), and 2 (*promoted*). See Appendix A for the complete measure.

Political orientation. We measured the political orientation of participants using a single-item 7-point scale (similar to that of Graham et al., 2009), anchored as follows: -3 (*strongly liberal*), -2 (*moderately liberal*), -1 (*slightly liberal*), 0 (*neutral*), 1 (*slightly conservative*), 2 (*moderately conservative*), and 3 (*strongly conservative*). While political orientation has various dimensions (e.g., social, fiscal), the singular liberal–conservative distinction has been shown to be a good predictor of behavior and opinions in the U.S. context (Jost, 2006).

Analytic strategy. The goal of this set of analyses was to produce stimulus materials—ratings of the foundational impact of 40 influential people, as they vary by political ideology—for Studies 2 and 3 and for subsequent research. Moreover, we examined whether and to what degree these ratings varied with political ideology. Do liberals and conservative agree about the foundational impacts, or do they diverge? To address these questions, we estimated a multilevel regression model for each foundation (viz., care, fairness, loyalty, authority, purity) as follows:

$$F_{rt} = \beta_0 + u_{0r} + u_{0t} + \beta_1 PO_r + u_{1t} PO_r + \varepsilon_{rt}. \quad (1)$$

Model 1 maps out how foundation ratings of targets change with the political orientation of the rater. F_{rt} is rater r's foundation rating of target t. PO_r is rater r's political orientation, entered as a continuous variable (3 to -3). The coefficients that permit tests of whether liberals and conservatives judge the targets differently are β_1 and u_{1t}.

Assessing political disagreement about foundation impacts. The unstandardized regression coefficient β_1 (estimated by b_1) represents the population average relationship between foundation ratings and political orientation (across the 40 targets). For example, if β_1 is positive for care, then conservatives rated the 40 targets to be higher on care than liberals did.

We also examined whether disagreement about targets' impact varied from target to target (e.g., if conservatives rated Reagan as higher on care than liberals did). To test this in Model 1, we allowed the impact of participant political orientation on foundation rating to vary randomly across targets captured by the latent interaction term u_{1t}, which denotes the incremental increase or decrease (from the sample average) in the relationship between foundation rating and political orientation for target t. For target t, the relationship between rater political orientation and foundation impact increases by $\beta_1 + u_{1t}$ for each increment on the PO scale. To the extent that partisans disagree about a target, $\beta_1 + u_{1t}$ departs from 0.

To systematically assess whether the relationship between political orientation and foundation ratings varied across targets, we calculated the standard deviation of the coefficient u_{1t} across targets, estimated by $\hat{\tau}_1$. Specifically, $\hat{\tau}_1^2$ indexes the Rater $\times$ Target interaction variance accounted for by participant political orientation. In other words, the estimate of $\hat{\tau}_1$ assesses the extent to which some targets' foundation impact is politically contentious whereas other targets' impact is politically unanimous. Values of $\hat{\tau}_1$ near 0 imply that political orientation predicts foundation rating the same across all the targets (specifically β_1). In contrast, high values of $\hat{\tau}_1$ imply that u_{1t} varies greatly across targets (e.g., that political orientation predicts foundation ratings positively for some targets and null/negatively for other targets).

Producing stimulus materials. The terms in Model 1 allowed us to produce stimulus materials for Studies 2 and 3 by estimating the foundational impact of each target, as they may vary (to whatever degree they may) by political orientation. Another term in Model 1 is β_0, a constant—the average foundation rating across all targets and raters when $PO_r = 0$. Foundation ratings are allowed to vary randomly across raters and targets at this level of political orientation, denoted by u_{0r} and u_{0r}, respectively. Of interest here is u_{0t}, which is target t's average deviation from the set of targets' mean rating (across raters) when $PO_r = 0$. Thus target t's foundation rating, as a function of a rater's specific level of political orientation, can be determined as

$$F_t = \beta_0 + u_{0t} + (\beta_1 + u_{1t})PO_r. \quad (2)$$

Equation 2 represents the average foundation rating for target t across different raters who all share the same political orientation value, namely, PO_r. As this expression contains two random effects (latent values), we calculated the empirical Bayes estimate of u_{0t} and u_{1t}, denoted as $\hat{u}_{0t}$ and $\hat{u}_{1t}$, respectively, to determine each target's foundation rating as a function of a rater's political orientation. We estimated Model 1 separately for each of the five moral foundations using R's lme4 package (Bates & Sarkar, 2007; R Development Core Team, 2012).

Results and Discussion

Political agreement about foundation impact. Did foundation ratings vary with political orientation? For example, did liberals rate the set of targets higher on care than conservatives did, in general? Across the set of 40 targets, political orientation of raters was consistently unpredictive of foundation impact ratings: b_1 ranged from $-.02$ to $.01$, $ts(90) < |.95|$, $ps > .34$. In other words, liberals did not see the targets as being generally more caring or fair (etc.) than conservatives did.

Did liberals, compared to conservatives, rate *some targets* higher on care and other targets lower on care? What about for the other foundations? The relationship between rater ideology and impact rating did not vary across targets for authority, $\hat{\tau}_1 = 0.03$, $\chi^2(1) = 0.24$, $p = .31$, or loyalty, $\hat{\tau}_1 = 0.03$, $\chi^2(1) = 0.95$, $p = .17$ (see Hox, 2010, pp. 49–50, for a discussion of testing variance components). However, the association between rater political orientation and foundation ratings varied significantly across target

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[4] Participants responded to one of 10 surveys, each with its order of targets randomized. No order effects were found.

figures for care, $\hat{\tau}_1 = 0.08$, $\chi^2(1) = 29.04$, $p < .001$; fairness, $\hat{\tau}_1 = 0.09$, $\chi^2(1) = 41.03$, $p < .001$; and purity, $\hat{\tau}_1 = 0.05$, $\chi^2(1) = 10.37$, $p < .001$. In other words, liberals and conservatives uniformly agreed about who promoted authority and loyalty but diverged significantly on some targets when deciding who promoted care, fairness, and purity.

To assess the functional impact of political orientation on foundation ratings, we calculated the model-implied correlation between strongly liberal raters ($PO = -3$) with strongly conservative raters ($PO = 3$) across the 40 targets. For both authority and loyalty foundations, these ratings correlated extremely highly at $r(38) = .98$ and .90, respectively. For the three foundations where political orientation significantly moderated foundation ratings across targets, liberal ratings and conservative ratings still correlated strongly, $rs(38) = .89$, .84, and .91 for care, fairness, and purity, respectively. Assessing the foundational impacts of others seems to be a primarily descriptive task, with political leaning having, at times, a statistically significant albeit practically minor impact upon ratings.

Target foundation impact. We determined foundation impact scores for each target conditional on rater political orientation following Equation 2. The second column of Appendix B presents mean model-implied foundation impacts of each target by politically neutral raters. The third column of Appendix B presents increments from the mean, that is, how much one step on the political orientation scale tunes up or tunes down each foundation rating. On average, foundation impacts were 14 to 56 times larger in magnitude than increments due to political ideology (depending on the foundation). For example, political ideology had only a small effect on Reagan's authority ratings, with his mean being 1.48 and his increment being 0.01. That means that Reagan's authority score is 1.51 for strong conservatives ($PO = 3$) and 1.45 for strong liberals ($PO = -3$).

On average across raters, reliability in the ratings of the five foundations was extremely high, $.96 \leq$ intraclass correlation (ICC) $\leq .99$, although reliability levels diminished for highly conservative raters given their relative paucity. For politically neutral raters, the top exemplar for each foundation was Martin Luther King, Jr., for both care and fairness; David Ben-Gurion for loyalty; Pope John Paul II for authority; and Billy Graham for purity.

Relationships among foundations. Correlations among foundation impacts are shown in Table 1. Because foundation scores hardly varied, we report the model-implied intercorrelations

Table 1
Model-Implied Correlations Among Foundation Ratings of Influential Figures/Targets for Politically Neutral Raters (Study 1)

Moral foundation	1	2	3	4	5
1. Care	(.98)				
2. Fairness	.92***	(.98)			
3. Loyalty	−.24	−.06	(.73)		
4. Authority	−.56***	−.71***	.36*	(.92)	
5. Purity	.31*	.18	.14	.16	(.94)

Note. $N_{\text{targets}} = 40$. Diagonal values are intraclass correlations for political orientation $= 0$.
* $p < .05$.   *** $p < .001$.

for the politically neutral rater. The individualizing foundations correlated almost perfectly with one another, implying that the same people who promote care also promote fairness and vice versa; the binding foundations similarly correlated positively with one another, albeit often not significantly so. Relationships between individualizing and binding foundations were more varied. A general pattern (with one exception) was that loyalty and purity were unrelated to the individualizing foundations. Authority negatively predicted the individualizing foundations. This latter finding suggests that promoting authority may often involve undermining concerns for care and fairness, calling into question the MFT claim that the five foundations are independent. Building authority versus promulgating care/fairness may present a seemingly mutually exclusive tradeoff for people of influence.

Summary. Study 1 produced stimulus materials—ratings of the foundational impact of 40 influential people—for Studies 2 and 3 as well as for subsequent research. When making these judgments, liberals and conservatives largely converged about each target's standing on each foundation. Some minor disagreements emerged for foundations of care, fairness, and purity. Regardless of the extent of these disagreements, we retained this minor variability into subsequent studies when we examined the relationship between foundation impacts and moral judgments.

Study 2: Which Foundations Predict Moral Judgments for Academic Judges?

Having described the impact of target figures on each moral foundation in Study 1, we now explore the foundations that liberals and conservatives use when making moral judgments about influential people. A new sample of liberal and conservative college professors rated the moral character of the same 40 targets as in Study 1. Analyses explored which foundations are associated with the moral person and how political ideology tunes up or tunes down these associations.

Method

Participants. Instead of sampling from U.S. state universities, we increased variance on political orientation by sampling faculty experts from highly liberal and conservative colleges. The Princeton Review reports the 20 most liberal and 20 most conservative schools in the United States (as determined by student report; "College Rankings," 2010). We gathered contact information for professors in the social sciences (e.g., history, political science, global studies) from all 40 college websites and sent each professor an individualized e-mail requesting his or her participation.

Out of 1,213 recruitment e-mails sent, $N = 177$ professors (24% female[5]) completed the online survey (14.6% response rate). Interestingly, professors at both liberal and conservative institutions were liberal leaning ($Ms = -2.1$ and -0.8, respectively). Liberal institutions were less ideologically diverse than conservative ones ($SDs = 1.2$ and 1.9, respectively). To help populate the conservative side and thus balance the sample, we sent 60% of the e-mail invitations to professors at conservative institutions. Conservative institution professors participated at about the same rate (15.2%) as

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[5] The liberal and conservative institution samples had similar gender distributions (24.2% and 23.4%, respectively).

liberal institution professors (13.7%). Participation took place between March 1 and April 18, 2011. Across all participants, political orientation was slightly liberal on average ($M = -1.25$, $SD = 1.81$, range $= -3$ to 3, skewness $= 1.00$).

Procedure. Each professor received an e-mail request to complete an online survey. As in Study 1, neither before nor during the rating of targets did experts learn of our interest in political orientation. The survey asked experts to rate the moral character of the 40 targets. The web-based stimuli were identical to those from Study 1 with one exception: A single-item measure of moral exemplarity replaced the foundation impact ratings. Participants were instructed to skip those targets with whom they were unfamiliar. Across the 40 targets, participants provided moral exemplarity ratings 78% of the time ($SD = 21\%$). Following the moral exemplarity ratings, participants provided their political orientation on the same scale as in Study 1.

Moral exemplarity. Participants reported the degree to which they perceived the target to be a moral exemplar by responding to the following question: "To what extent is this individual, overall, a moral exemplar? By 'moral exemplar' we mean a highly moral person." Responses were on a 7-point scale with the following anchors: -3 (*precisely unlike a moral exemplar*), -2 (*very much unlike a moral exemplar*), -1 (*a little unlike . . .*), 0 (*neutral*), 1 (*a little like . . .*), 2 (*very much like . . .*), and 3 (*precisely like . . .*).

Analytic strategy. We employed a strategy similar to that in Study 1, relying on multilevel regression modeling. A first model examines whether liberals and conservatives agree about who is moral, relying only on data from Study 2. The second model examines the foundational correlates of moral judgments for liberals and conservatives, integrating data from Studies 1 and 2.

Who is moral? Like Model 1, Model 3 describes how raters make judgments about targets and estimates how much political orientation tunes up or tunes down those judgments. The two models differ in one important way. Whereas Model 1 concerns judgments about foundation impacts (F), Model 3 concerns moral judgments (M) about targets. The specific multilevel model we examined was

$$M_{rt} = \beta_0 + u_{0r} + u_{0t} + \beta_1 PO_r + u_{1t}PO_r + \varepsilon_{rt}. \quad (3)$$

Here, M_{rt} is rater r's moral judgment of target t on a -3 to 3 scale. PO_r is rater r's political orientation on the -3 to 3 scale. The coefficient β_0 represents the average moral rating of all targets by all raters (when $PO_r = 0$). We allowed moral exemplarity ratings to vary randomly by participant and target: u_{0r} is rater r's deviation from the sample average moral rating (of all the targets), and u_{0t} is target t's deviation from the average moral rating (from all the raters and when $PO_r = 0$).

The regression coefficient β_1 represents the relationship of rater political orientation and moral judgments across the 40 targets. For example, if β_1 is positive, conservatives rated all 40 targets as more moral than liberals did, on average. As in Study 1, we allowed the political orientation–moral rating relationship to vary randomly across targets, indexed by u_{1t} for each target. The variability of the coefficient u_{1t} across targets, estimated by $\hat{\tau}_1^2$, indexes the Participant $\times$ Target interaction variance accounted for by participant political orientation in the model. Therefore, the degree to which political orientation predicts moral ratings for a particular target, t, is $\beta_1 + u_{1t}$. Because the corresponding random effect estimates (empirical Bayes) do not yield t and p values, we

regressed *PO* on moral ratings separately for each target and operationalized divisiveness as the ordinary least squares (OLS) slopes.[6] If conservatives saw Reagan as more moral than liberals did, divisiveness$_{\text{Reagan}}$ would be a large, positive number. When divisiveness $= 0$, the two groups agreed perfectly on that target.

Foundational correlates of moral judgment. Integrating the results from Study 1 and Study 2, we now examined which foundations predict moral judgments. We relied on a multilevel model similar to Model 3, only adding foundation ratings and an interaction term as predictors. Model 4 assesses how strongly associated foundations are with moral judgments and how much political orientation moderates this relationship:

$$M_{rt} = \beta_0 + u_{0r} + u_{0t} + \beta_1 PO_r + u_{1t}PO_r + \beta_2 F_{rt} + \beta_3 F_{rt} \times PO_r$$

$$+ \varepsilon_{rt}. \quad (4)$$

In Model 4, we do not assume that a given target has the same perceived foundational impact for liberals and conservatives. We accommodate any disagreement between partisans in foundation ratings (see Appendix B) by allowing F_{rt} to vary with political orientation.[7] That is, F_{rt} is the estimated foundation score for target t (from Study 1) for someone of rater r's political orientation.[8]

The regression coefficient β_2 represents the foundation–morality association, ignoring the effect of politics (i.e., with $PO_r = 0$). We dub β_2 the *virtue coefficient*. For a particular foundation, if the virtue coefficient is high, targets who promoted that foundation are perceived as moral exemplars, on average across the political spectrum. If the virtue coefficient is negative, the foundation is negatively associated with morality (i.e., the foundation is a vice).

Of import, β_3 captures the extent to which political ideology moderates the foundation–morality relationship, permitting a test of whether liberals and conservatives rely on different moral foundations. If $|\beta_3|$ is high, the list of virtues is likely different for liberals and conservatives. The virtue coefficient for each political ideology is thus calculated as $\beta_2 + \beta_3 PO_r$. For example, the strongly conservative ($PO = 3$) virtue coefficient is $\beta_C = \beta_2 + 3\beta_3$ for a given foundation, and the corresponding liberal ($PO = -3$) virtue coefficient is $\beta_L = \beta_2 - 3\beta_3$.

Results and Discussion

Which targets are the most moral? Figure 1 presents the model-implied (Model 3) moral exemplarity ratings for each of the

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[6] OLS slopes are unbiased estimates when the predicted value is a dependent variable (outcome). Empirical Bayes estimates provide unbiased estimates of relationships when used as predictors in a model, which is why we used them to determine the F_{rt} and M_{rt} scores.

[7] This decision turned out to have little empirical effect on subsequent analyses. All results are isomorphic when we hold the foundation ratings to be the same for all raters, regardless of political orientation. In other words, preserving (vs. ignoring) the impact of political orientation on foundation ratings has no substantive impact on these results.

[8] In all analyses, we kept PO_r and F_{rt} in their original metric and *not* centered as values of 0 so that the results remain directly interpretable and represent important values with which to examine relationships (i.e., $PO_r = 0$ represents political neutrality, and $F_{rt} = 0$ represents a target that neither promoted nor undermined that moral foundation). Grand mean centering would result in estimates that skewed toward liberals given the sample demographics.

Figure 1. Model-implied moral exemplarity ratings on the 40 targets for the extremes of the political spectrum (Study 2). Liberals are −3 and conservatives are 3 on the 7-point scale. Targets are in rank order of the overall mean. Error bars indicate standard errors.

40 targets for the extremes of the political ideology scale. The most moral targets in the eyes of strong liberals were Nelson Mandela, Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr.; the most moral targets to strong conservatives were Mother Teresa, Ronald Reagan, and Pope John Paul II. The top-three ranking targets were different for each ideology. However, seven targets were among the top-15 ranking targets for both groups.

Even at these political extremes, liberals and conservatives agreed to some sizeable extent about who was moral, model-implied $r(38) = .35$. At the midpoint of the political orientation scale ($PO = 0$), the moral evaluations of the targets approached consensus (ICC $= .98$).

Which targets are the most divisive?   In spite of some agreement about who was moral, important divergences also emerged. In fact, the degree to which liberals and conservatives converged in their moral evaluations varied from target to target, $\hat{\tau}_1 = 0.28$, $\chi^2(1) = 861.93$, $p < .001$.

Table 2 presents divisiveness scores for the 40 targets. The most divisive targets were Sanger, Reagan, and Thatcher. Mother Teresa's divisiveness (.10) was closer to the sample average ($M = .23$, $SD = .13$) than that of Reagan (.65). Recalling the opening anecdote, we now see that Reagan is not a representative influential figure. He is a statistical outlier—the object of abnormally strong political disagreement. Mother Teresa is a more typical influential figure.

How do liberals and conservatives make moral judgments about people?   Table 3 presents virtue coefficients (b_2) for the five foundations, as derived from Model 4. Ignoring political ideology (for the moment), the strongest virtues are care, fairness, and purity. Loyalty is neutral, and authority is a vice. Next, we examine how considering political orientation may (or may not) change the strength and direction of these virtues.

Which foundations predict moral excellence for liberals? How about for conservatives? Figure 2 presents the model-implied foundation–morality relationship for strongly liberal and strongly conservative judges ($b_L = b_2 − 3b_3$ and $b_C = b_2 + 3b_3$, respectively).[9] Both liberals and conservatives see target figures who promoted care, fairness, and purity as highly moral. While both perspectives predicted the former two associations, only MFT predicted the latter.

Loyalty predicted morality for neither ideological group. The data do not lend support to the MFT claim that conservatives regard targets who promoted loyalty as moral exemplars. This could be attributable to restriction of range in the present sample. Targets were generally seen as loyalty promoters. This restriction could be equally interpreted as a problem for the present study or a problem for a theory that frames loyalty as an important individual difference variable. Influential individuals who betrayed their own ingroup (e.g., Jesus, Buddha) may be rare.

Similarly, the data do not support the MFT claim that authority predicts morality for conservatives. Moreover, authority is negatively associated with morality for liberals: *Underminers* of authority—radicals, revolutionaries, dissenters, and draft dodgers—are the liberal moral superheroes. Promoting authority is a liberal vice.

Does purity uniquely predict moral attributions?   The historic perspective within moral psychology did not predict the purity–morality association. Might this association be an artifact of other,

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[9] Standardized simple slopes (b^*) were determined by multiplying the unstandardized simple slope by (s_e/s_x) where s_e is the standard deviation of the residuals from the multilevel model and s_x is the standard deviation of the foundation ratings across the 40 targets.

Table 2

Divisiveness Scores of the 40 Targets in Rank Order of Descending Magnitude (Study 2)

Target	Divisiveness	SE	t	p
Margaret Sanger	−0.682	0.065	−10.46	<.001
Ronald Reagan	0.653	0.053	12.26	<.001
Margaret Thatcher	0.628	0.054	11.62	<.001
Harvey Milk	−0.608	0.069	−8.79	<.001
Ho Chi Minh	−0.519	0.060	−8.68	<.001
Che Guevara	−0.481	0.058	−8.32	<.001
Eleanor Roosevelt	−0.325	0.057	−5.69	<.001
V. I. Lenin	−0.323	0.055	−5.92	<.001
Billy Graham	0.301	0.055	5.45	<.001
Muhammad Ali	−0.282	0.058	−4.86	<.001
Robert Kennedy	−0.277	0.055	−5.02	<.001
Winston Churchill	0.275	0.054	5.08	<.001
Pope John Paul II	0.271	0.055	4.97	<.001
Ayatullah Khomeini	−0.267	0.055	−4.82	<.001
Mikhail Gorbachev	−0.265	0.054	−4.89	<.001
Charles Lindbergh	0.264	0.065	4.06	<.001
Mao Zedong	−0.258	0.056	−4.64	<.001
Teddy Roosevelt	0.244	0.056	4.36	<.001
Marilyn Monroe	−0.230	0.057	−4.00	<.001
Franklin Roosevelt	−0.220	0.053	−4.11	<.001
Martin Luther King, Jr.	−0.212	0.053	−3.99	<.001
Nelson Mandela	−0.210	0.056	−3.77	<.001
Princess Diana	−0.179	0.057	−3.13	.002
John F. Kennedy	−0.163	0.053	−3.05	.002
David Ben-Gurion	0.163	0.083	1.97	.05
Mohandas Gandhi	−0.140	0.054	−2.57	.01
Rosa Parks	−0.131	0.056	−2.36	.02
Andrei Sakharov	−0.108	0.065	−1.65	.10
Emmeline Pankhurst	−0.101	0.108	−0.93	.35
Mother Teresa	0.098	0.054	1.79	.07
Bill Wilson	0.084	0.092	0.91	.37
Lech Walesa	0.080	0.056	1.43	.15
Helen Keller	−0.061	0.061	−1.00	.32
Anne Frank	0.049	0.059	0.84	.40
Tenzing Norgay	−0.047	0.110	−0.43	.67
Bruce Lee	−0.047	0.081	−0.57	.57
Jackie Robinson	−0.031	0.063	−0.49	.62
Edmund Hillary	−0.020	0.106	−0.19	.85
Adolf Hitler	0.007	0.053	0.12	.90
Pelé	0.002	0.083	0.02	.98

Note. Positive divisiveness scores imply that conservatives favored the target compared to liberals and vice versa. Degrees of freedom were different for every target and ranged from 41 to 173, with median = 136.

stronger relationships? For example, might care and fairness be the drivers and purity the passenger? We tested whether purity uniquely predicts moral attributions while controlling for the effects of the other four foundations in a regression model. For both liberals and conservatives, the relationship between purity and morality remained intact when controlling for the other foundations: liberals, $b_2 = .47$, $b_2^* = .22$, $t(163) = 3.48$, $p < .001$; conservatives, $b_2 = 1.17$, $b_2^* = .55$, $t(163) = 3.83$, $p < .001$. Purity uniquely predicted moral attributions for academic conservatives and liberals alike.

Why do liberals and conservatives sometimes disagree? Which foundations predict moral judgments differently for liberals and conservatives? Recall that we operationalized political disagreement as a statistical interaction, the increment by which political orientation increases or decreases the foundation–morality association, represented by β_3 in Model 4 and estimated

by b_3. Visually, political disagreement is the difference in the slopes shown in Figure 2. Table 3 presents inferential statistics for political disagreement increments.

Political disagreement emerged for three of five foundations: authority, purity, and fairness (marginally). Care and loyalty foundations were not sources of political disagreement. However, all five relationships are in the direction that MFT predicts: Liberal-favored targets promoted care and fairness; conservative-favored targets promoted authority, loyalty, and purity. The most divisive targets were those whose legacy concerned promoting or undermining authority. Targets who undermined authority (e.g., Sakharov, Guevara, Parks, Pankhurst, Sanger, Milk, Ali) were particularly polarizing.

Summary. One partisan's hero was rarely the other's villain. For liberals and conservatives alike, virtues were the same three foundations of care, fairness, and purity. Loyalty was not predictive of moral judgments. Authority was the exception: For liberals, authority was a vice; for conservatives, authority was, in and of itself, neither a virtue nor a vice. MFT neatly predicted why some figures were divisive: Liberals relied more on care and fairness and less on loyalty, authority, and purity than conservatives did. However, the historic perspective better accounted for how each group made moral judgments in the grand scheme of things, with MFT's claim of the moral relevance of purity augmenting the list. Together, these finding suggested that universal agreement about the constitution of moral goodness was more prominent that disagreement.

Study 3: Folk Partisans and Targets' Morality

Academic raters are not representative of the population in several ways. While they are well informed about historical figures, college professors could hold moral views that are more or less extreme or polarized than those of the general population. In Study 3, we tested whether these effects replicated with a nonacademic sample.

An online sample of folk raters evaluated the moral character of the same 40 targets as in Study 2. Whereas the raters in Study 2 were social scientists and therefore likely to have informed opinions about the targets, participants in Study 3 may have been less knowledgeable. For this reason, the survey also asked participants

Table 3

Foundations of the Moral Person and the Moderating Role of Political Orientation (Study 2)

Moral foundation	Virtue coefficient			Moderation: increment		
	b_2	$t(171)$	p	b_3	$t(171)$	p
Care	1.02	9.17	<.001	−.03	−0.92	.36
Fairness	1.04	7.90	<.001	−.07	−1.93	.06
Loyalty	0.22	0.45	.65	.10	0.99	.32
Authority	−0.39	−1.57	.12	.23	4.84	<.001
Purity	1.35	4.88	<.001	.15	2.26	.03

Note. Virtue coefficients, b_2, quantify the average association between each foundation and moral judgments for politically neutral judges. Increment statistics test whether political orientation moderates the foundation–morality relationship. Quantitatively, increments represent how much one scale step in political orientation toward conservatism increases the virtue coefficient.

Figure 2. Liberal and conservative professors rely on care, fairness, and purity when judging influential people (Study 2). Model-implied virtue coefficients (b^*) are the association between impacts that targets had on each moral foundation and moral exemplarity, as judged by strongly liberal ($b_L^* = b_2^* - 3b_3^*$) and strongly conservative ($b_C^* = b_2^* + 3b_3^*$) expert raters. $^* p < .05.$ $^{***} p < .001.$

to report their familiarity with each target. Familiarity ratings aside, the analytic strategy was identical to that of Study 2.

Method

Participants. Recruited through http://mturk.com, participants were adults (19 years of age and older), located in the United States, and had at minimum 90% approval rate on that website. They received $0.25 for the completing the task.

Of the people who completed the online survey, 124 identified as liberal, 46 as neutral, and 52 as conservative ($N = 222$). On average, the sample was slightly liberal ($M = -0.68$, $SD = 1.60$, range $= -3$ to 3, skewness $= 0.39$). The sample averaged 36 years of age ($SD = 13$), was 57% female, was 79% Caucasian, and had 4.2 years of postsecondary education ($SD = 2.5$). Of the 189 participants who reported having been eligible to vote in the 2008 presidential election, 147 reported voting for either John McCain (Republican; conservative) or Barack Obama (Democrat; liberal). Corroborating their political self-identification, of these voters, 8% of liberal participants, 31% of neutral participants, and 83% of conservative participants voted for the conservative candidate, John McCain. Participation took place during January 6–28, 2012.

Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in Study 2, with one exception. For each target, the survey asked participants, "How familiar are you with this individual?" Participants responded on a 4-point Likert-type scale, anchored as follows: 0 (*not at all familiar*), 1 (*a little familiar*), 2 (*moderately familiar*), and 3 (*very familiar*). Participants who reported being not at all familiar (0) with a target were instructed to refrain from providing a moral rating for that target.

Results and Discussion

Do folk raters claim to be familiar with the *Time* targets? The majority of participants reported some familiarity with the targets (reports of 1, 2, or 3 on the 0–3 scale). Across all 40 targets, nonzero familiarity was claimed 80% of the time ($SD = 23\%$). Those participants who had some familiarity and rated moral exemplarity claimed to be approximately "moderately familiar" with the targets ($M = 2.13$, $SD = .32$). Participants claimed to be sufficiently familiar with the targets to make informed judgments about their moral character.

Which targets are the most moral? Figure 3 presents the model-implied moral exemplarity ratings for each of the 40 targets for each end of the political ideology scale. The most moral targets in the eyes of strong liberals were Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Rosa Parks; the most moral targets to strong conservatives were Mother Teresa, Ronald Reagan, and Mohandas Gandhi. Nine targets were among the top-15 ranking for both groups. Liberal moral exemplarity ratings and conservative ratings

Figure 3. Model-implied moral exemplarity ratings on the 40 targets for the extremes of the political spectrum (Study 3). Liberals are −3 and conservatives are 3 on the 7-point scale. Targets are in the same order as in Figure 1. Error bars indicate standard errors.

correlated very strongly, $r(38) = .76$, $p < .001$. This agreement correlation between political poles was stronger for folk raters (Study 3) than for academic raters (Study 2; $z = 2.71$, $p = .007$). One other noteworthy difference between academic and folk ratings was the conspicuously high ratings of Bruce Lee by folk raters. Those two differences aside, the pattern of moral exemplarity ratings are overwhelmingly the same.

Consistent with Study 2, at the midpoint of the scale ($PO = 0$), there was substantial consensus on the moral exemplarity of the 40 targets (ICC = .99).

Which targets are the most divisive? In spite of the strong agreement about who was moral, important divergence also emerged for some targets, $\hat{\tau}_1 = .16$, $\chi^2(1) = 222.48$, $p < .001$. Table 4 presents divisiveness scores for the 40 targets. The most divisive targets were Reagan, Graham, and Milk. Replicating Study 2, Reagan is a polarizing figure, an extremely controversial influential person, a statistical outlier, and thus unrepresentative of influential figures. Mother Teresa's divisiveness (.14) was closer to the sample average ($M = .13$, $SD = .08$) than that of Reagan (.45). Mother Teresa is a more typical influential figure than Reagan.

How do liberals and conservatives make moral judgments about people? Figure 4 presents virtue coefficients for liberals and conservatives. Replicating the findings from Study 2, the list of virtues includes care, fairness, and purity. Loyalty and authority are neither virtue nor vice for conservatives. The list of virtues is identical for liberals and conservatives.

Is purity a unique predictor of morality? Does purity account for moral attributions above and beyond the variance explained by the individualizing foundations? For liberals, the relationship between purity and morality, $b_2 = .15$, $b_2^* = .07$, $t(164) = 0.62$, $p = .54$, was no longer significant when controlling for the other

foundations; for conservatives, the relationship between purity and morality remained intact, $b_2 = .76$, $b_2^* = .35$, $t(164) = 3.15$, $p = .002$. Purity uniquely predicts moral attributions for folk conservatives, but not for folk liberals.

Why do liberals and conservatives sometimes disagree? Which foundations predict moral judgments differently for liberals and conservatives? Table 5 presents inferential statistics for political disagreement increments. Political disagreement emerged for two of five foundations: authority and purity (with care being marginally significant at $p = .07$). Fairness and loyalty foundations were not sources of political disagreement. Unlike in Study 2, two of the five relationships are not in the direction that MFT predicts: *All* five foundations were more strongly associated with moral judgments for conservatives. Again, the most divisive foundation was authority.

Summary. Some minor effects did not replicate from Study 2 to Study 3:

• Generally speaking, political ideology played a smaller role in moderating folk raters' moral judgments than in those of academic raters.

• When controlling for the other foundations, purity was not independently predictive of moral judgments for folk liberals where it was for academic liberals.

• Whereas political ideology marginally moderated the fairness–morality association in Study 2 (but not care–morality), the opposite was true in Study 3.

However, the important effects of Study 2 replicated with folk raters:

• Care, fairness, and purity are the virtues for both ideologies.

Table 4

Divisiveness Scores of the 40 Targets in Rank Order of Descending Magnitude (Study 3)

Target	Divisiveness	SE	t	p
Ronald Reagan	0.462	0.053	8.66	<.001
Billy Graham	0.405	0.058	7.00	<.001
Harvey Milk	−0.341	0.074	−4.63	<.001
Marilyn Monroe	−0.296	0.053	−5.54	<.001
Margaret Sanger	−0.279	0.063	−4.40	<.001
Che Guevara	−0.272	0.067	−4.04	<.001
V. I. Lenin	−0.244	0.059	−4.12	<.001
John F. Kennedy	−0.226	0.053	−4.23	<.001
Margaret Thatcher	0.169	0.058	2.91	.004
Robert Kennedy	−0.155	0.055	−2.83	.005
Ho Chi Minh	−0.154	0.066	−2.33	.020
Muhammad Ali	−0.147	0.054	−2.73	.006
Pope John Paul II	0.146	0.054	2.68	.007
Mother Teresa	0.136	0.053	2.55	.01
Ayatullah Khomeini	−0.133	0.062	−2.13	.03
David Ben-Gurion	0.118	0.079	1.50	.13
Emmeline Pankhurst	−0.117	0.084	−1.39	.16
Bruce Lee	−0.114	0.053	−2.15	.03
Mao Zedong	−0.105	0.062	−1.69	.09
Rosa Parks	−0.094	0.054	−1.75	.08
Martin Luther King, Jr.	−0.088	0.053	−1.66	.10
Franklin Roosevelt	−0.077	0.054	−1.43	.15
Andrei Sakharov	−0.072	0.076	−0.95	.34
Winston Churchill	0.072	0.055	1.31	.19
Jackie Robinson	0.065	0.057	1.16	.25
Teddy Roosevelt	0.048	0.054	0.90	.37
Tenzing Norgay	0.048	0.096	0.50	.61
Anne Frank	0.044	0.054	0.83	.41
Helen Keller	0.043	0.054	0.80	.42
Lech Walesa	−0.042	0.073	−0.57	.57
Princess Diana	−0.037	0.054	−0.68	.50
Mohandas Gandhi	−0.036	0.056	−0.65	.52
Charles Lindbergh	0.027	0.056	0.48	.63
Nelson Mandela	−0.026	0.056	−0.46	.64
Eleanor Roosevelt	−0.023	0.055	−0.42	.68
Pelé	−0.020	0.061	−0.32	.75
Edmund Hillary	0.012	0.077	0.15	.88
Adolf Hitler	−0.009	0.053	−0.17	.86
Mikhail Gorbachev	−0.004	0.056	−0.07	.95
Bill Wilson	−0.003	0.074	−0.04	.97

Note. Positive divisiveness scores imply that conservatives favored the target compared to liberals and vice versa. Degrees of freedom were different for every target and ranged from 58 to 175, with median = 142.

- Authority is a vice for liberals.
- Ideology moderates the virtuosity of authority and purity toward conservatism.
- Authority is the most divisive foundation.

General Discussion

Do liberals and conservatives have qualitatively different moral points of view? Do they rely on different moral foundations when judging the character of influential figures? Or are many influential figures the objects of ideological consensus? The present research predominantly supports the latter supposition. The results from three studies provide compelling evidence of moral category sharing among American liberals and conservatives when making character judgments of influential people.

Study 1 produced stimulus materials by determining the legacy of each target figure in terms of the five moral foundations. Studies 2 and 3 compared the moral evaluations of these targets by liberal and conservative academic and folk raters, respectively. Care, fairness, and purity were positive predictors of moral exemplarity for both ideologies. Both the historic perspective and MFT predicted the former two; only MFT predicted the latter. However, the results did not lend support to MFT's prediction of loyalty–morality and authority–morality associations.

Authority and purity consistently predicted disagreement between the ideologies. While both perspectives predicted the divisiveness of authority, only MFT predicted that political ideology would moderate the authority–morality association so strongly. Moreover, MFT better predicted the divisiveness of purity and the general (nonsignificant) pattern of findings. Whereas MFT has added much to our understanding of why people morally disagree, the historic perspective still best accounts for the nature of morality itself.

Morality Is About Care, Fairness, and Purity

Half a century into the empirical study of morality, scholars have yet to agree on a definition of morality. Moreover, scholars have yet to agree on *how* morality should be defined—by what it *is* (content) or by what it *does* (function). Kohlberg (1981) advocated for a content definition based in justice/fairness, Gilligan (1982) advocated for care, and Turiel (1983) in some sense mediated, advocating for both. All of these scholars defined morality by its content. Haidt (2008) argued that morality is best defined by its function (in regulating or suppressing self-interest), which may or may not turn out to include any of the five foundations, as the case may be. The advantage of a functional definition is that it raises the question assumed by content-specific definitions. What is the content of morality? Does it vary across ideological or cultural divides?

The present findings are supportive of a content-specific definition of morality. Three foundations—care, fairness, and purity—predicted moral attributions of liberals and conservatives, academic and folk. For neither ideology was loyalty a predictor of morality. Target figures who undermined authority received the approbation of liberal academics. Otherwise, authority was unpredictive of moral evaluations.

MFT has rightly expanded the definition of morality to include purity. For conservatives (both academic and folk), purity remained a significant, independent predictor of morality even when controlling for the effects of care and fairness. For liberals, purity remained a unique predictor for academics but not for folk raters. Current research (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2012) is exploring the independent role of purity in moral judgment.

What about purity do liberals and conservatives see as a character virtue? The definition includes multiple components, including generic character strength (e.g., control of desires), which may be useful for realizing care and fairness. The purity foundation also entails corporeal integrity (e.g., physical contagion, wholesomeness) and religious and spiritual mores (e.g., chastity). Might different aspects of the purity foundation belong in the moral domain for liberals and conservatives? Future research is needed to deconstruct and clarify the definition of this foundation (and others).

Figure 4. Liberal and conservative Americans rely on care, fairness, and purity when judging influential people (Study 3). Model-implied virtue coefficients (b^*) are the association between impacts that targets had on each moral foundation and moral exemplarity, as judged by strongly liberal ($b_L^* = b_2^* - 3b_3^*$) and strongly conservative ($b_C^* = b_2^* + 3b_3^*$) folk raters. $^{**} p < .01$. $^{***} p < .001$.

A foundation correlating with moral judgment (even in an unmediated fashion) is not sufficient evidence to back a claim about the foundation causing moral judgments. A limitation of the present study is the correlational nature of the design. Future experimental work is needed to address the causal role of foundations in forming moral character attributions.

Table 5
Foundations of the Moral Person and the Moderating Role of Political Orientation (Study 3)

Moral foundation	Virtue coefficient			Moderation: increment		
	b_2	$t(172)$	p	b_3	$t(172)$	p
Care	1.14	9.91	<.001	.04	1.81	.07
Fairness	1.08	7.29	<.001	.03	1.15	.25
Loyalty	−0.45	−0.96	.34	.09	1.41	.16
Authority	−0.43	−1.64	.10	.13	4.27	<.001
Purity	1.34	4.49	<.001	.11	2.98	.003

Note. Virtue coefficients, b_2, quantify the average association between each foundation and moral judgments for politically neutral judges. Increment statistics test whether political orientation moderates the foundation–morality relationship. Quantitatively, increments represent how much one scale step in political orientation toward conservatism increases the virtue coefficient.

Similarly, null associations between loyalty/authority and morality do not necessarily imply that these foundations are morally irrelevant. These foundations could function as means of delivery of the other moral goods (e.g., fairness). If so, persons who use their authority to promote fairness would be seen as especially moral, and persons who use authority to undermine fairness would be seen as especially immoral. Future research is needed to examine foundation interactions.

Moral Foundation Theory Best Explains Disagreements

When isolating *disagreements* between liberals and conservatives, the two ideologies seem to have different moral languages, especially when it comes to matters of authority and purity. For example, Ronald Reagan is a conservative champion but a liberal antagonist. This is perhaps because of Reagan's authority impact—his defense of authority structures against dissidents and his economic policies that increased social hierarchy. MFT predicted this finding, which closely resembles the pattern of previous supportive studies that focused on the evaluation of moral issues (e.g., Graham et al., 2009, 2011).

In contrast, when considering which qualities differentiate heroes from villains for each ideology independently, liberals and conservatives seem to have a common set of three foundations:

care, fairness, and purity. The strength of these trends, to a small degree, depends on political ideology. Namely, liberals emphasize care and fairness more than conservatives do, and vice versa for purity. However, the commonality between the ideologies drowns out the differences. When thinking of figures like the highly divisive Reagan, we lose sight of the striking commonality—liberals and conservatives alike see care-, fairness-, and purity-promoting figures (like Mother Teresa and Gandhi) as prototypic of morality. The historic perspective better predicted this finding than did MFT. In sum, MFT better predicted disagreement variance, and the historic perspective better predicted moral evaluation variance.

Until now, support for MFT came predominantly from responses to a select set of *issues* set forth in the Moral Foundation Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011) and similar measures (e.g., tapping stereotypes). Previous research (e.g., Graham et al., 2011) has uniformly found that liberals rely on two foundations and conservatives rely on all five (two vs. five). In the present research, MFT adds value by explaining *disagreements* between the ideological camps.

When considering the morality of individuals who were selected for reasons independent of disagreement (viz., impact), liberals and conservatives alike relied on a common set of three foundations (three and three). Conclusions about the nature of human morality depend on *what* is being measured. Previous empirical support for MFT may have been restricted to the points of disagreement between partisans—controversial issues (e.g., chastity)—issues unrepresentative of the full spectrum of moral judgments that people make.

Choice of samples, issues, and units can have a profound impact on the analysis and conclusions (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). To understand human morality, should we be analyzing issues, stereotypes, or actual people? Ultimately, a comprehensive theory of morality needs to explain all three in a unified, coherent way. Issues do provide insight into moral judgment, but issues, by definition, involve disagreement. By selecting stimulus materials rife with disagreement, previous MFT research may have overestimated the psychological differences between liberals and conservatives. People can and do make uncontroversial moral judgments all the time.

A critical point of divergence between the present findings and previous MFT-supportive results concern the moral relevance of loyalty and authority. Graham et al. (2011) found that conservatives rate loyalty and authority issues as having moral relevance equal to care, fairness, and purity issues. The present findings are that loyalty and authority are uncorrelated with moral judgments of conservatives. What might account for the discrepancy? One possibility is a bias to interpret loyalty and authority items in the MFQ as being in relation to people of one's own culture and a failure to consider loyalty and respect for authorities of antagonistic groups. For example, consider the following item from the MFQ: "Whether or not someone showed a lack of respect for authority" (Graham et al., 2011, p. 385). This item and others like it have an unstated, ambiguous referent. To which authority is someone showing disrespect? Perhaps participants interpret *authority* to mean *authority that I believe to be legitimate.*

In the present study—and concerning conservative judges only—Ronald Reagan and Che Guevara fit this bias: Reagan was a promoter of legitimate authority and a highly moral figure, Guevara was an underminer of legitimate authority and an immoral figure. In contrast, Hitler and Sakharov do not fit

this bias. Hitler was a promoter of illegitimate authority and yet a highly immoral figure; Sakharov was an underminer of illegitimate authority (the U.S.S.R.) and a highly moral figure. Any positive association between authority and morality stemming from trend-confirming figures (e.g., Reagan, Guevara) may have been canceled out by trend-disconfirming figures (e.g., Hitler, Sakharov) in the present study. If this interpretation of moral judgment processes is correct, people will judge MFT issues differently depending on the referents. Future research should explore which foundations underlie judgments of a representative sampling of everyday moral topics ranging from controversial to consensual and recipients of these actions being morally good or bad.

MFT has placed political ideology at the fore of individual differences. In this research, political ideology plays only a small role in explaining moral judgment. Traits, motivation, emotion, and cognition are likely more fundamental sources of individual difference governing the moral compass.

While MFT may have relied on an unrepresentative sampling of the moral life, the present research may (to some degree) have done the same. Influential figures are unrepresentative of all people. The most influential people of the 20th century are, by definition, statistical outliers. Whether the processes that underlie judgments of influential figures correspond to the processes that underlie judgments of everyday targets is a matter for future research. Moreover, *Time* magazine targets may be left-leaning and U.S.-centric. Future research should explore these same questions with target sets that are more international and better represent the political spectrum. A similar limitation of the present studies is their sole reliance on American raters. Future work is also needed to bridge the conceptual and methodological gaps between the present research and previous work supportive of MFT.

Conclusion

Does each ideology have its own unique moral point of view? Or do different ideologies rely on some overlapping (or even identical) moral norms, structures, values, or foundations when forming moral judgments? This issue has been central to the psychological study of morality since the field's beginning. Skinner (1972) and the behaviorists argued that morality is contextually relative, conditioned by environmental contingencies; Kohlberg (1984) and the structural-developmentalists countered, arguing that morality is universally about justice and that the structure of morality follows a culturally invariant developmental sequence; and Haidt and moral foundation theorists (Haidt & Graham, 2007) took a nuanced middle ground by identifying the specific foundations that are culturally relative and universal.

Applied to the question of what makes a person moral in the eyes of others, this research has introduced and implemented a new method that specifies the predictive power of the universalist and relativist perspectives. The present results support a swing toward the universalist perspective.

Educating the next generation involves cultivating certain moral beliefs, be they tolerance of others, compassion for the less fortunate, or obedience to authority. Parents and teachers cannot help but influence such beliefs. While the moral foun-

dations that partisans use to make moral judgments are not identical, they are overwhelmingly similar. At least on the topic of what makes a good person, liberals and conservatives concur.

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Appendix A

The Measure of Moral Foundation Impact

For each of the following aspects, in what way did this individual's actions have an impact?

	undermined −2	−1	neutral 0	1	promoted 2
Care/avoiding harm: "basic concerns for the suffering of others, including virtues of caring and compassion."	○	○	○	○	○
Fairness/reciprocity: "concerns about unfair treatment, inequality, and more abstract notions of justice."	○	○	○	○	○
Ingroup/loyalty: "concerns related to obligations of group membership, such as loyalty, self-sacrifice and vigilance against betrayal."	○	○	○	○	○
Authority/respect: "concerns related to social order and the obligations of hierarchical relationships, such as obedience, respect, and proper role fulfillment."	○	○	○	○	○
Purity/sanctity: "concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, including virtues of chastity, wholesomeness and control of desires."	○	○	○	○	○

Note. The text in quotation marks after each foundation label is quoted from Haidt, Graham, and Joseph (2009, pp. 111–112).

Appendix B

Foundation Impact Scores of 40 Influential Figures From the 20th Century for the Five Moral Foundations

Target	Mean	Increment	N_{raters}
		Care foundation	
Martin Luther King, Jr.	1.891	−0.003	100
Mohandas Gandhi	1.763	−0.046	99
Eleanor Roosevelt	1.726	−0.049	92
Nelson Mandela	1.726	−0.022	99
Mother Teresa	1.687	−0.063	99
Robert Kennedy	1.522	−0.053	96
Helen Keller	1.507	−0.025	81
Andrei Sakharov	1.486	−0.054	66
Anne Frank	1.482	0.013	91
Bill Wilson	1.477	−0.047	37
Lech Walesa	1.403	0.015	88
Franklin Roosevelt	1.339	−0.036	99
Rosa Parks	1.337	−0.037	92
Harvey Milk	1.314	−0.081	82
Princess Diana	1.205	−0.059	89
Emmeline Pankhurst	1.117	−0.069	45
John F. Kennedy	1.062	−0.027	99
Margaret Sanger	1.047	−0.167	66
Pope John Paul II	1.041	−0.029	99
Billy Graham	1.031	0.094	94
Jackie Robinson	0.746	−0.033	82

(*Appendices continue*)

Appendix (*continued*)

Target	Mean	Increment	N_{raters}
Muhammad Ali	0.544	0.017	86
Mikhail Gorbachev	0.475	−0.026	97
Tenzing Norgay	0.446	−0.012	22
Pelé	0.438	0.018	55
Edmund Hillary	0.379	−0.030	33
David Ben-Gurion	0.364	−0.050	64
Bruce Lee	0.189	−0.029	46
Winston Churchill	0.163	−0.015	89
Teddy Roosevelt	0.155	−0.086	88
Marilyn Monroe	0.033	−0.017	83
Che Guevara	−0.016	−0.127	85
Ho Chi Minh	−0.325	−0.123	76
Charles Lindbergh	−0.586	0.060	85
Ronald Reagan	−0.634	0.192	99
V. I. Lenin	−1.020	−0.064	97
Margaret Thatcher	−1.055	0.117	95
Ayatullah Khomeini	−1.205	0.018	90
Mao Zedong	−1.394	0.005	91
Adolf Hitler	−1.910	0.015	100
Fairness foundation			
Martin Luther King, Jr.	1.942	−0.023	100
Rosa Parks	1.876	−0.027	91
Nelson Mandela	1.875	−0.033	99
Mohandas Gandhi	1.860	−0.025	99
Emmeline Pankhurst	1.730	−0.074	44
Eleanor Roosevelt	1.702	−0.047	91
Harvey Milk	1.694	−0.055	83
Jackie Robinson	1.653	−0.037	83
Lech Walesa	1.648	0.002	90
Andrei Sakharov	1.644	−0.026	65
Robert Kennedy	1.480	−0.061	96
Anne Frank	1.455	0.023	92
Helen Keller	1.346	−0.058	79
Mother Teresa	1.221	−0.082	98
John F. Kennedy	1.221	−0.030	99
Franklin Roosevelt	1.212	−0.050	99
Muhammad Ali	1.161	−0.008	86
Pope John Paul II	0.880	0.063	99
Margaret Sanger	0.876	−0.180	66
Che Guevara	0.861	−0.173	85
Princess Diana	0.786	−0.044	88
Mikhail Gorbachev	0.727	0.013	96
Teddy Roosevelt	0.722	0.017	89
Bill Wilson	0.714	−0.048	36
David Ben-Gurion	0.602	−0.050	64
Ho Chi Minh	0.599	−0.163	76
Edmund Hillary	0.560	0.003	33
Pelé	0.515	0.030	55
Bruce Lee	0.465	0.004	46
Billy Graham	0.442	0.081	93
V. I. Lenin	0.381	−0.021	96
Tenzing Norgay	0.352	0.003	21
Winston Churchill	0.175	−0.001	89
Marilyn Monroe	0.014	0.004	84
Mao Zedong	−0.422	−0.084	91
Ronald Reagan	−0.616	0.193	99
Charles Lindbergh	−0.682	0.076	85
Ayatullah Khomeini	−0.743	0.110	90
Margaret Thatcher	−0.832	0.168	95
Adolf Hitler	−1.836	0.043	99

(*Appendices continue*)

Appendix (*continued*)

Target	Mean	Increment	N_{raters}
	Loyalty foundation		
David Ben-Gurion	1.689	−0.008	66
Winston Churchill	1.582	0.000	89
Ayatullah Khomeini	1.445	−0.021	90
Ho Chi Minh	1.441	−0.042	77
Pope John Paul II	1.401	0.001	99
Mao Zedong	1.321	−0.035	91
Adolf Hitler	1.293	−0.036	100
Nelson Mandela	1.249	−0.002	98
Rosa Parks	1.247	0.000	93
Emmeline Pankhurst	1.224	−0.001	45
Lech Walesa	1.223	−0.010	88
Harvey Milk	1.218	−0.014	82
V. I. Lenin	1.217	−0.042	97
Che Guevara	1.166	−0.024	85
Billy Graham	1.163	−0.023	94
Anne Frank	1.118	−0.002	91
Ronald Reagan	1.105	0.009	99
Bill Wilson	1.081	−0.009	36
Teddy Roosevelt	1.081	−0.006	89
Franklin Roosevelt	1.023	−0.012	99
Martin Luther King, Jr.	1.012	−0.038	100
John F. Kennedy	0.999	0.009	99
Margaret Thatcher	0.991	0.012	94
Jackie Robinson	0.857	−0.031	82
Muhammad Ali	0.842	0.001	85
Robert Kennedy	0.830	−0.009	96
Charles Lindbergh	0.821	−0.010	85
Tenzing Norgay	0.772	−0.026	22
Mohandas Gandhi	0.740	−0.031	97
Mother Teresa	0.705	−0.004	99
Eleanor Roosevelt	0.621	−0.013	90
Pelé	0.611	−0.024	54
Margaret Sanger	0.608	−0.016	64
Helen Keller	0.482	−0.012	81
Edmund Hillary	0.376	−0.027	33
Mikhail Gorbachev	0.366	−0.025	97
Bruce Lee	0.334	−0.019	46
Andrei Sakharov	0.219	−0.036	66
Princess Diana	0.054	−0.019	89
Marilyn Monroe	−0.004	−0.015	85
	Authority foundation		
Pope John Paul II	1.586	0.010	99
Winston Churchill	1.525	0.019	89
Margaret Thatcher	1.495	0.020	95
Ronald Reagan	1.481	0.019	98
Adolf Hitler	1.428	−0.010	100
Billy Graham	1.405	0.010	94
Ayatullah Khomeini	1.257	0.005	90
Teddy Roosevelt	1.235	0.019	88
Franklin Roosevelt	1.015	0.016	100
David Ben-Gurion	0.928	0.006	65
Mao Zedong	0.923	0.005	91
John F. Kennedy	0.804	0.016	99
Charles Lindbergh	0.764	0.011	85
Mother Teresa	0.744	0.014	99
Ho Chi Minh	0.615	0.005	77
Bill Wilson	0.541	0.012	33

(*Appendices continue*)

Appendix (*continued*)

Target	Mean	Increment	N_{raters}
Robert Kennedy	0.503	0.004	96
Tenzing Norgay	0.426	0.008	22
Eleanor Roosevelt	0.288	0.017	91
V. I. Lenin	0.276	0.006	97
Mikhail Gorbachev	0.220	0.008	97
Edmund Hillary	0.171	0.010	33
Jackie Robinson	0.108	0.012	83
Pelé	0.087	0.014	55
Bruce Lee	0.070	0.012	46
Helen Keller	0.038	0.010	79
Princess Diana	0.017	0.009	89
Anne Frank	−0.010	0.024	91
Marilyn Monroe	−0.109	0.016	85
Nelson Mandela	−0.320	0.028	97
Lech Walesa	−0.353	0.022	90
Martin Luther King, Jr.	−0.397	0.029	99
Mohandas Gandhi	−0.404	0.028	98
Muhammad Ali	−0.621	0.003	85
Harvey Milk	−0.677	0.010	83
Margaret Sanger	−0.697	0.007	65
Emmeline Pankhurst	−0.737	0.001	44
Rosa Parks	−0.766	0.022	93
Che Guevara	−0.876	0.030	85
Andrei Sakharov	−0.890	−0.006	66
Purity foundation			
Billy Graham	1.596	0.055	93
Mother Teresa	1.567	0.040	99
Mohandas Gandhi	1.414	0.013	98
Pope John Paul II	1.371	0.065	99
Bill Wilson	1.239	0.018	36
Ayatullah Khomeini	1.023	−0.013	89
Teddy Roosevelt	0.702	0.024	88
Anne Frank	0.676	0.037	90
Nelson Mandela	0.521	0.010	98
Helen Keller	0.514	0.014	80
Bruce Lee	0.428	−0.007	46
Martin Luther King, Jr.	0.425	0.024	100
Eleanor Roosevelt	0.423	−0.032	90
Jackie Robinson	0.415	−0.016	81
David Ben-Gurion	0.382	0.009	64
Ronald Reagan	0.382	0.055	98
Rosa Parks	0.345	−0.016	92
Tenzing Norgay	0.275	−0.008	22
Andrei Sakharov	0.271	−0.014	66
Margaret Thatcher	0.211	0.027	92
Pelé	0.166	−0.017	55
Edmund Hillary	0.158	−0.027	32
Emmeline Pankhurst	0.138	−0.043	44
Muhammad Ali	0.115	−0.043	85
Lech Walesa	0.060	−0.010	89
Winston Churchill	0.048	−0.012	86
Charles Lindbergh	0.032	−0.041	84
Mikhail Gorbachev	−0.012	−0.009	93
Margaret Sanger	−0.033	−0.067	64
Robert Kennedy	−0.042	−0.048	95
Franklin Roosevelt	−0.062	−0.010	99
Ho Chi Minh	−0.114	−0.067	76
Mao Zedong	−0.148	−0.066	91
Che Guevara	−0.223	−0.052	83

(*Appendices continue*)

Appendix (*continued*)

Target	Mean	Increment	N_{raters}
V. I. Lenin	−0.321	−0.060	95
Adolf Hitler	−0.323	−0.032	99
Princess Diana	−0.335	−0.019	88
Harvey Milk	−0.417	−0.057	83
Marilyn Monroe	−0.810	−0.040	84
John F. Kennedy	−0.816	−0.082	99

Note. For each of the five foundations, target figures are presented in rank order from promote to undermine. Foundation scale anchors were −2 (*undermined*), 0 (*neutral*), and 2 (*promoted*). Means ($\bar{F}_{rt} = b_0 + \hat{u}_{0t}$) are the model-implied average foundation rating for politically neutral raters ($PO = 0$). Increments ($= b_1 + \hat{u}_{1t}$) are measures of variability such that means increase by the increment for each step toward conservatism on the political orientation scale. Political orientation scale anchors ranged from −3 (*strongly liberal*) to 3 (*strongly conservative*).